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INTRODUCTION

Experts estimate that well-over half of the infrastructure1
needed to accommodate population growth in the United States, by
2050, does not yet exist. 2 The demand for new, expanding
infrastructure systems stems from existing funding shortages,
necessary to maintain aging infrastructure, and worsening threats
of infrastructure-failure.3 The risks posed by the United States’
underfunded and rapidly aging infrastructure are well
documented.4 In light of these risks, the Trump Administration
issued Executive Order No. 13807 (“the Order”) to facilitate
drafting of federal legislation, which would improve the
environmental review and permitting processes for infrastructure
projects nationwide.5 The Order’s goals included identification of

1. “Infrastructure,” as discussed in this paper, refers to road and transit
systems, along with such critical elements of the nation’s surface transportation
infrastructure, including highways, bridges, and commercial rail. However,
arguments made within apply equally to utility infrastructure systems (e.g.,
drinking water, wastewater, and energy).
2. Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster,
and the Future of the American City, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2157, 2158–59 n.10 (2011)
(citing Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million: Reshaping of
America’s Built Environment, PLAN., Jan. 2007, at 4 (estimating that the United
States will reach a population of 400 million by 2037)).
3. See AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 4–
5
(2017),
https://www.
infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Full-2017-ReportCard-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UBU-VZZL] [hereinafter REPORT CARD]; see
also Eric Jaffe, America’s Infrastructure Crisis is Really a Maintenance Crisis,
CITYLAB (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2015/02/americasinfrastructure-crisis-is-really-a-maintenance-crisis/385452/
[https://perma.cc/J2XW-XL4W] (asserting recent deadly infrastructure failures including an electrical malfunction on the D.C. Metrorail on January 12, 2015,
and a series of incidents on New York City’s Metro-North commuter railroad
between 2013 and 2014 - resulted from poor maintenance).
4. See generally AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, FAILURE TO ACT: CLOSING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT GAP FOR AMERICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE (2016),
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads
/2016/05/2016-FTA-Report-Close-the-Gap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QZ2J-T5DC]
(noting that water and wastewater systems are examples of aging infrastructure)
[hereinafter FAILURE TO ACT]; see also Steve Kroft, Falling Apart: America’s
Neglected
Infrastructure,
CBS
NEWS
(Nov.
23,
2014),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/falling-apart-america-neglected-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/96XG-QUH5].
5. Exec. Order. No. 13807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463, 40,466 (Aug. 24, 2017).
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methods to increase public-private partnerships (“P3s”) needed to
fund the maintenance and expansion of public infrastructure.6
The Trump Administration released the Legislative Outline
for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America (“the Plan”) on February
12, 2018.7 The Plan, which “[estimated to] stimulate at least $1.5
trillion. . .over the next 10 years,” advocates for limiting federal
investments to under 20% of a project’s total cost, while also
placing greater responsibility on states and municipalities to fund
important infrastructure projects in partnerships with privatesector firms.8 In order to transfer the responsibility of planning,
funding, maintaining, and operating major infrastructure projects
to states, municipalities, and the private-sector, the Plan depends
on P3 agreements meeting demands for funds, resources, and
expertise.9 The Plan also emphasizes investments in rural, over
urban-infrastructure, and roadways, over transit-systems—
policies that are likely to promote sprawl.10 Any legislation
developed from such policies will certainly (1) shift the
responsibility of funding infrastructure projects from the federal
government to private sources, (2) increase the need for P3s
between both state- and-local governments and private-developers,
and (3) move away from recent federal Smart Growth policies.11

6. Id. at 40,463.
7. THE WHITE

HOUSE,
LEGISLATIVE OUTLINE FOR REBUILDING
INFRASTRUCTURE
IN
AMERICA
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefingroom/304441/legoutline.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7ZF-FY8X] [hereinafter THE
PLAN].
8. See id. at i, 3, 5.
9. See id. at 3–4.
10. See id. at 5–7. Although the Plan does discuss elimination of federal law
that constrains funds available for capital transit projects, this single addition
does little to counteract the overall policy. See id. at 20–25; see also Patricia E.
Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a National Land
Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 385–86 (2002).
11. See THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET 2018 BUDGET: INFRASTRUCTURE
INITIATIVE
(2018),
https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/fact_sheets/2018%
20Budget%20Fact%20Sheet_Infrastructure%20Initiative.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EBZ5-FHWH]; see Salkin, supra note 10, at 382; see generally
Smart Growth, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth [https://perma.cc/UC8LQYB7] (noting different programs and benefits surrounding Smart Growth
initiatives) [hereinafter Smart Growth].
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Although subsequent political and economic events decreased
the likelihood of comprehensive infrastructure legislation,12
executive and administrative actions have already reduced or
eliminated federal funding for infrastructure projects.13
Regardless of whether the federal government takes legislative
action, the nation’s infrastructure continues to age and continues
to threaten environmental, economic, and physical harm to the
public.14 The responsibility to fund public infrastructure projects
will likely continue to fall on cash-strapped states. Therefore,
states and municipalities will need to enter into P3 agreements in
order to fund infrastructure development, while also considering
necessary protections to the public’s environmental and economic
interests from risks associated with such agreements.
Inspired by the Plan’s infrastructure policy, this Note
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of modern P3 agreements
used for public infrastructure projects, and legislative options
states have to support P3 use for the protection of the public’s
environmental and economic interests. Tools like P3 and Smart
Growth legislation help states prepare for the management of
12. See David Shepardson, Republicans, Democrats Fight Over
Infrastructure Plans, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-infrastructure/republicans-democrats-fight-over-infrastructure-plansidUSKBN1FS3CU [https://perma.cc/J9AE-F2YB] (revealing how passage of
infrastructure legislation quickly became subject to political disputes and
partisan politics); see also Mike DeBonis, Democrats to Unveil $1 Trillion
Infrastructure
Plan,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/democrats-to-unveil-1-trillioninfrastructure-plan-seek-reversal-of-gop-tax-cuts-tofinceit/2018/03/07/0de718f621c811e894daebf9d112159c_story.html?utm_term=.c
794c98444a3 [https://perma.cc/UNQ6-WQPD]; see also Ryan Mallory Shelbourne,
Infrastructure Plan will Come in ‘Five or Six Different Bills’, THE HILL (Mar. 8,
2018),
https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/infrastructure/377472-ryaninfrastructure-plan-will-come-in-5-or-6-different [https://perma.cc/XRS5-LBSF];
see also Michael Sargent & Anthony Kim, Steel & Aluminum Tariffs a Big Threat
to
Trump’s
Infrastructure
Plan,
THE
HILL
(Mar.
9,
2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/377553-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-abig-threat-to-trumps-infrastructure-plan [https://perma.cc/4ZZV-UGS6].
13. See Karen Yi, Feds Deal Major Blow to Gateway Tunnel Project, NJ.COM
(Dec.
30,
2017),
http://www
.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/12/federal_funding_deal_for_gateway_tunnel_projec
t_no.html [https://perma.cc/36E8-U9NV]; see also Grace Guarnieri, Trump Halts
$13 Billion Obama Amtrak Plan Despite Calls for Infrastructure Spending in
2018, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-amtrakinfrastructure-spending-766861 [https://perma.cc/AY9R-TCST].
14. See REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 5.
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these often-competing positions. A review of the Plan and existing
federal Smart Growth policy reveals how the Plan failed to
integrate Smart Growth principles to address common weaknesses
of P3 use, such as, limited public input, inappropriate projects, and
projects that promote sprawl.15
In order to facilitate infrastructure development that
integrates both P3s and Smart Growth, states can incorporate
Smart Growth policies into new or amended P3 legislation or adopt
separate, but complementary, legislation. An analysis of a recent
P3 agreement in Maryland provides further instruction on how P3
and Smart Growth laws and policies interact with states and
municipalities. This interaction can protect the public’s
environmental and economic interests to the greatest extent
possible when forming P3 agreements. Further, these tools may be
implemented regardless of whether federal infrastructure
development legislation is successful or current federal Smart
Growth policy continues.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN
INFRASTRUCTURE

The United States’ most visible infrastructure systems are
arguably the nation’s 4 million miles of streets, roads, and
highways.16 Vehicle-miles traveled hit a record high in 2016, when
people and goods moved over 3.2 trillion miles.17 Unsurprisingly,
the most cited effect of inadequate maintenance and backlogged
rehabilitation to the nation’s roadways are congestion and traffic
delays.18 Increased traffic congestion causes road conditions to
disintegrate faster, and poor road conditions increase automobile

15. See THE PLAN, supra note 7, at 3–4 (promoting sprawl by highlighting
new development and rural expansion while allocating zero funds to the
maintenance and repair of urban-transit’s existing physical infrastructure); see
also Matti Siemiatycki & Naeem Farooqi, Value for Money and Risk in Public–
Private Partnerships, 78 J. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N 286, 288 (2012) (identifying
common shortcomings of P3); see also Deborah Ballati & Richard
Robinson, Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons Learned and Predictions for the
Future, 34 CONSTR. L. 27, 32-33 (2014).
16. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 76.
17. Id.
18. See id.
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accident rates.19 In 2017, 40% of all urban interstate highways
were congested, and 20% of highway pavement was in poor
condition.20 The American Society of Civil Engineers (“ASCE”)
reported that, “[a]fter years of decline, traffic fatalities increased
by 7% from 2014 to 2015 . . . .”21
Road infrastructure quality directly impacts the national
economy. In 2014, poor road conditions caused traffic, which used
3.1 billion gallons of fuel, and delayed Americans by 6.9 billion
hours, amounting to $160 billion in wasted time.22 The ASCE
directly correlates insufficient investment in infrastructure
maintenance to broad, negative economic impacts. 23 The ASCE
found that aging infrastructure causes every American household
to lose $3,400 annually.24 By 2025, the ASCE predicts that
infrastructure underperformance will cost the United States $3.9
trillion in gross domestic product (“GDP”), $7 trillion in business
sales, and 2.5 million jobs.25
Discussions about maintenance, repair, or replacement of
existing roads and highways should concurrently consider the
conditions and availability of transit systems. 26 The earliest
domestic transit systems, constructed in the late-1800s, were
privately owned.27 As the automobile decreased transit’s profit
19. See id.; see also Rajeev Kumar et al., Smart Management of Heavy Traffic
Urban Roads, 04 INT’L RES. J. OF ENGINEERING & TECH. 840, 841 (2017)
(“[P]avement that can last for 10 years without overloading will last only for 6.5
years, if there is 10 percent overloading on an average. With 30 percent
overloading, the same pavement will last only for 3.5 years. The situation has led
to swift rate of deterioration. . .”).
20. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 76; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN. & FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2015 STATUS OF
THE NATION’S HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT: CONDITIONS AND PERFORMANCE,
at
5–3
(2015),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2015cpr
/pdfs/2015cpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4EQ-CGNX] (defining “Congestion, which
can be recurring or nonrecurring, occurs when traffic demand approaches or
exceeds the available capacity of the system.”) [hereinafter HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES,
AND TRANSIT].
21. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 76.
22. Id. at 76.
23. FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 4, at 3–4.
24. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 7.
25. Id. (citing FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 4, at 7).
26. See REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 88. Existing roadway maintenance is
important for public transit because bus riders make up half of transit passenger.
See id.
27. HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT, supra note 20, at 2–21.
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margins post-World War II, governments recognized the
importance of facilitating sustained transit services.28 However,
transit’s physical infrastructure (e.g., tracks and signals) currently
represents some of the worst infrastructure conditions nationally.
Thirty-five percent of guideway elements like tracks and 37% of
stations reported by the ASCE are “not in a ‘state of good repair.’”29
Transit systems nationwide face a $90 billion rehabilitation
backlog.30 These shortcomings pose severe risks to public safety
and harm public perception of transit’s dependability. 31 Although
new lines are added annually, only 11% of Americans take public
transportation at least once a week.32 This suggests that those who
cannot access transit must instead rely on automobiles for nonwalkable or non-bikeable distances. Without immediate and
continued investment, Americans will not be enticed to increase
their use of public-transit, an outcome that would help relieve the
burden on America’s roads.33
Despite the clear and imminent risks, deep funding shortages
persist.34 State and municipal governments struggle to secure the
funds for “maintaining or rebuilding existing infrastructure that
currently needs repair or replacement,” as well as, “building new
infrastructure to service an increasing population that will reach
380 million by 2040, and the expanded economic activity and
infrastructure use resulting from this growth and added
28. Id.; see also REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 88 (highlighting how even
today, the nation’s transit lines continue to grow, providing 10.5 billion trips in
2015, or a 33% increase over 20 years).
29. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 89.
30. Id. at 90.
31. See id. at 91; see also Jonathan English, Why Did America Give Up on
Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame Cars.), CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/08/how-america-killedtransit/568825/ [https://perma.cc/79MG-4WDJ].
32. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 88–89 (also noting 49% of American
households remain unable to access public transit to complete basic tasks).
33. See Michael L. Anderson, Subways, Strikes, and Slowdowns: The
Impacts of Public Transit on Traffic Congestion, SEMANTIC SCHOLAR 1, 2 (2013),
https://are.berkeley.edu/~mlanderson/pdf/Anderson_transit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24ZB-C7T9] (finding an abrupt increase in average road-traffic
delays of 47% when Los Angeles transit services ceased).
34. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 7 (“[T]he U.S. has only been paying half of
its infrastructure bill for some time and failing to close that gap risks rising costs,
falling business productivity, plummeting GDP, lost jobs, and ultimately, reduced
disposable income for every American family.”).
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demands.”35 The Plan offers one approach, a heavy reliance on the
creation of P3 agreements.36 Though necessary to secure funding,
P3s often limit public input and are not appropriate for every
infrastructure project.37 Passage of comprehensive P3 legislation
at the state level could proactively reduce the risk of harm to the
public from inappropriate or unsuccessful agreements.
III.
A.

A HISTORY IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS
Full-Privatization with Limited Government
Oversight

History provides insight into the concerns associated with
private investment in public infrastructure. Before the twentiethcentury, the private sector exercised sizeable control over the
infrastructure development process, ranging from project design to
finance and operations.38 This era produced many major
infrastructure advancements, but full-privatization produced
“poor safety records, . . . labor abuses, corrupt business practices,
and unequal distribution of services.”39 The balance of
responsibility for infrastructure development, and maintenance
shifted from the private-sector to the public-sector by the mid1900s, as the federal government recognized “high-quality public
infrastructure” as an important public-interest concern.40
B.

Government Controlled Design-Bid-Build
Approach

From the 1950s until the late 1970s, the public design-bidbuild (“DBB”) approach to infrastructure development created

35. FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 4, at 2.
36. See THE PLAN, supra note 7.
37. See Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288; see also Ballati &
Robinson, supra note 15, at 32–33.
38. Matti Siemiatycki, The Global Experience with Infrastructure PublicPrivate Partnerships, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 6, 6 (2012) (acknowledging that
private entities were subject to limited government approval and monitoring).
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id.
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“‘the Golden Age’ of infrastructure.’”41 Under the public DBB
model, government agencies designed projects in-house in
consultation with private engineers or planners.42 The government
then completed a competitive bidding process to choose a private
builder able to complete the project to the government’s
specifications.43 Under this approach, the public sector considers
its own criteria to prioritize investment and finances construction
through government debt or bonds.44 Rather than imposing new
user fees on the public, these funds are repaid via general
government revenues.45
However, the DBB approach possessed shortcomings. Matti
Siemiatycki46 describes how the public sector’s involvement at
different project stages created a “highly disaggregated”
structure.47 The public DBB model created multiple contractualpartnerships between the government and public firms, such as
design, construction, and finance firms, which caused financial
risks to fall on the public partner.48 Thus, infrastructure project
design, construction, and operation, though publicly controlled,
still struggled to protect the public’s economic interests. 49 By the
1970s, the public sector understood that large, critical
infrastructure projects were often prone to “systematic cost
overruns and construction delays, followed by poor service quality;
construction not always of a high quality, leading to service
outages or unavailability; and lower-than-expected financial
returns, environmental amelioration, and social equity benefits.”50
Fiscally-concerned political aversion towards public-sector debt
soon limited the availability of public funds for infrastructure
maintenance and expansion.51
41. Id. (citing ALAN ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGA-PROJECTS: THE
CHANGING POLITICS OF URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENTS (Brookings Inst. ed., 2003)).
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Matti Siemiatycki, Associate Professor Profile, U. OF TORONTO,
http://geography.utoronto.ca/profiles/matti-siemiatycki/ [https://perma.cc/AP9M7ZCX].
47. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Modern PublicPrivate Partnership

Prevailing rhetoric in the late 1970s focused on government’s
general inefficiency and the public DBB method’s failure to support
the competition needed “to spur innovation.”52 Across the world,
governments sold off publicly-owned, significant infrastructure
operations in bus, rail, freight transportation, and more.53 At the
same time, federally-directed deregulation efforts sought to foster
competition amongst new private-sector partners.54 The mixed
outcomes of the resurgence in privatization, as well as ideological
disputes over privatization’s advantages, led many nations to halt
plans for wholesale privatization.55 These debates revealed the
need for a new model to successfully integrate the relative
strengths of both public and private-sector participants into
infrastructure agreements.56
The
contemporary
P3
emerged from government
experimentation since the 1980s with private-sector involvement
in the different stages of public-infrastructure projects.57
Siemiatycki describes three basic characteristics of contemporary
P3s: (1) the project provides both partners with some mutual
benefit; (2) the private sector makes some contractual concession
for a mix of design, construction, funding, and future operations;
and (3) the project risks are conveyed to the partner most equipped
to handle them.58 The National Council for Public-Private
Partnerships (“NCPPP”)59 prescribes that all P3s require a
contractual agreement between a public agency and a private
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (P3 agreements can involve the private sector in one or multiple
stages, including “design, construction, financing, [future] operation, and
maintenance”).
58. Id.
59. See About, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS,
https://ncppp.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/LS4U-F4SK] (“[The National Council
for Public-Private Partnership’s mission is to] advocate and facilitate the
formation of public-private partnerships at the federal, state and local levels,
where appropriate, and to raise the awareness of governments and businesses of
the means by which their cooperation can cost effectively provide the public with
quality goods, services and facilities.”).
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entity to share in the delivery of a service or facility for the general
public’s use.60 This model excludes the public DBB approach that
seldom involved “private financing upon which meaningful risk
transfer [was] predicated,” and simultaneously prevents outright
privatization (e.g., free enterprises governed through regulation
and controlled by the private sector in perpetuity).61
Experts consider “‘public-private partnership’. . .an umbrella
term that encompasses a wide array of agreements whereby
governments contract with private entities for the provision or
delivery of facilities or services to the public.”62 Models of P3
transactions
include
Build-Own-Operate,63
Design-BuildOperate,64 Operate-Maintain-Manage,65 Design-Build-Finance,66
and the “full-fledged P3” referred to as Design-Build-FinanceOperate-Maintain.67 Another commonly used model, the
concession contract, requires the public partner to concede some
physical infrastructure (e.g., a toll road or bridge) to a privatepartner for a certain number of years in return for a single and

60. See The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships - 7 Keys to
Success,
INFORMED
CYNIC,
http://www.informedcynic.com/P3/P3reports/2015%20-NCPPP-7-points-to-successc.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX5Z-XF9R].
61. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 7.
62. Kelsey Hogan, Protecting the Public in Public-Private Partnerships:
Strategies for Ensuring Adaptability in Concession Contracts, 2014 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 420, 425 (2014) (citing John Ziegler, Note, The Dangers of Municipal
Concession Contracts: A New Vehicle to Improve Accountability and
Transparency, 60 PUB. CONT. L.J. 571, 574 (2011)).
63. Id. at 425–26 (“where a private contractor builds and operates a facility
for public use or for the purpose of providing a public good, without ever
transferring ownership to the government or public sector”).
64. Id. at 426 (“whereby the government awards a single contract to a private
firm for the design, construction, and operation of a capital improvement project,
but the title to the facility remains with the public sector”).
65. Id. (“[W]here the government contracts with a private partner to operate,
maintain, and manage an existing facility or service.”).
66. Rebecca C. Lewis, New York’s Plodding Pace on P3s, CITY & ST. N.Y.
(Mar.
6,
2018),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/infrastructure/new-yorksplodding-pace-p3s.html [https://perma.cc/WD85-2R5M] (describing a model that
integrates private funding into the publicly controlled design-bid-build model).
67. Id. (“[T]he private company . . . designs and builds the project, . . .
partially finances it, then maintains and operates it for an agreed upon number
of years. This takes . . . risk off the state while providing a better end product
more quickly that the private company could also better maintain.”).
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significant up-front payment.68 The private-partner recovers the
cost of the upfront payment through collection of user fees (e.g.,
tolls or fares) during the concession period.69 The operation and
maintenance of the infrastructure typically becomes the privatepartner’s responsibility.70 Thus, a central benefit of P3 use for
public entities is the transfer of risk onto the private partners.
State P3 legislation should aim to ensure that contractual P3
agreements are structured so that risks and rewards are shared
fairly between both parties via contractually dictated
requirements for each stage of the project.71 Integration of Smart
Growth’s public-interest supportive principles into state P3
legislation and individual P3 agreements could help ensure wellstructured P3s for public-infrastructure.
Despite concerns associated with private investment in public
infrastructure, another key strength of P3s is it approaches
bipartisan reception at the federal and state levels. 72 Prior to the
release of the Plan, the Obama Administration undertook
initiatives to explore the use of P3s to fund the nation’s
infrastructure needs.73 Lawmakers interested in P3s, including
members of the bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Public Private
Partnerships (“Congressional P3 Caucus”), sought to understand
the benefits and challenges with P3 use for public-infrastructure
projects.74 The federal Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and
Treasury Department subsequently hosted a summit on
September 14, 2014, to gather recommendations on P3s. 75 In

68. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8 (describing a typical concession period
that ranges between 25 and 99 years).
69. Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 62, at 426.
70. Hogan, supra note 62, at 426; Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8.
71. Hogan, supra note 62, at 451–52 (discussing the importance of
negotiating the concession agreement’s terms in response to public demands);
Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8.
72. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6 (“[P3s] have been widely accepted across
partisan political lines [and] in the United States, both Democrat- and
Republican-controlled states have experimented with [P3s].”); see also PublicPrivate Partnerships May be Key to Unlock Doors to Potential Investors and
Project Opportunities, 38 CONSTR. CONTR. L. REP. 1, Nov. 7, 2014, at ¶ 242
(discussing the Obama Administration’s support of P3s for infrastructure
projects) [hereinafter Key to Unlock Potential Investors].
73. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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response to the finding that a “lack of unity in P3 enabling laws at
the federal and state level inhibited the use of P3s,” 76 the
Bipartisan Policy Center (“BPC”) published the P3 Model State
Legislation (“P3 Model Law”). 77 Based on an examination of P3
best practices nationwide, the four key components of the BPC’s P3
Model Law seek to: (1) enable P3 use in a variety of wide-ranging
projects, (2) create a state office dedicated to providing P3 expertise
and assistance, (3) standardize and promote best practices, and (4)
protect the public interest.78
Most states have embraced the P3 model in exchange for the
promise of lower costs and faster project completion times. 79
Through a mixture of legislative and regulatory actions, thirty-six
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, have authorized
some degree of P3 use for the development of public
infrastructure.80 The value attributed to P3 models derives from
“the belief that governments and firms working in meaningful
collaboration will deliver major infrastructure projects that have
better outcomes than any one party could deliver on their own.”81
For state and local municipal governments with limited funding
sources, the P3 structure shifts the financial burden from

76. Id.
77. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (P3) MODEL STATE
LEGISLATION,
(Dec.
2015),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/BPC-P3-Enabling-Model-Legislation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U827-9XRD] [hereinafter P3 MODEL LAW]; see also Model Law
Gives Template for State P3 Legislation, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS,
https://ncppp.org/model-law-gives-template-for-state-p3legislation/ [https://perma.cc/E5GZ-FVHS].
78. P3 MODEL LAW, supra note 77, at 3.
79. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72; see also Siemiatycki,
supra note 38, at 9 (citing ALLEN CONSULTING GROUP, FINAL REPORT:
PERFORMANCE OF P3S AND TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA (2007),
https://www.irfnet.ch/filesupload/knowledges/IPA_Performance%20of%20PPPs_2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UCV5-2JJ8] (“With a significant number of [P3s] now completed
and in operation, there is emerging evidence that [P3s] do in fact have a better
record than traditional design-bid-build projects at delivering infrastructure on
time and on budget.”)).
80. See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., State P3 Legislation, CTR.
FOR INNOVATIVE FINANCE SUPPORT, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/legislation/
[https://perma.cc/3LYQ-5AHA] [hereinafter State P3 Legislation].
81. Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 287.
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immediate, upfront costs to periodic payments, later payments, or
onto the public through use fees.82
Despite this widespread support, certain concerns are
intrinsic to P3 use in public-infrastructure projects. While
supporters of P3 agreements claim these models reduce costs,
there are doubts about the transfer of financial risk and other
financial benefits to the public partner. When a P3 agreement
involves the repayment of some or all of a private partner’s
concession payment through scheduled payments from the public
partner, the government becomes subject to substantially higher
interest rates than those applied to standard government
borrowing.83 Furthermore, P3s may also result in higher base costs
than projects delivered through public-procurement because, “the
private-sector partner charges a premium for bundling various
design and construction functions into a single concession and
taking on greater risk.”84 Third, when investors recover their
initial investments through user fees, concerns arise about
investors that capture excessive profits.85 In such agreements, the
private partner assumes the project’s revenue risk and publicpartners regularly lose control over fee rates, service coordination,
and integration of the project into the wider network—all to the
detriment of public users.86 When repayment depends on tolls and
user fees, disputes between a private-partner and a future
government over an agreement made by the preceding government
regarding user fee rates, service quality, and public desires to
upgrade contractually-conceded infrastructure are common.87
Another common concern with P3 use is limited public input.
Commercial confidentiality requirements, a private partner’s
desire to limit costs, and the contracting government’s possible
interest in capitalizing on a one-time concession payment can
collectively limit meaningful public input in contract formation
and project development.88 Limitation of public involvement at
82. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8.
83. Id. at 9 (“This amounts to an additional $20 to $40 million in financing
costs for every $100 million that the private-sector partner borrows over a 35-year
concession period.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id.
88. Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288.
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conceptualization, planning, and approval stages creates
transparency and accountability issues and risks the development
of infrastructure that fails to meet public needs.89 The public’s
social, economic, and environmental interests in infrastructure
development are great and varied.90 Infrastructure projects, which
consider how best to meet public needs from early development
stages, are more likely to succeed at producing successful
infrastructure that provide adequate financial returns. 91 The
possible influence of public input on a project’s success supports
the need for state P3 legislation that seeks to ensure early public
involvement and consultation in project development.92
Critics further worry that contractual P3 agreements lack
flexibility and create unstable partnerships.93 Siemiatycki states
that, “a common critique of [P3s] has been . . . the risk of present
decision makers locking in the policy options of future
governments[,]” stifling future project innovation by making “it
difficult or costly for governments to retrofit infrastructure . . .
over time to meet changing conditions, public demands, or evolving
policy objectives.”94 If key risks are not properly divided between
the public and private partners and possible circumstantial
changes are not provided for in the agreement, an unstable
partnership may occur and require expensive contract
renegotiations or a cancelation at the public’s expense.95 Examples
89. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 9.
90. Robert Puentes, Why Infrastructure Matters: Rotten Roads, Bum
Economy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/whyinfrastructure-matters-rotten-roads-bum-economy/
[https://perma.cc/Q8LFRNCH]; see Richard Threlfall, The Importance of Infrastructure Investment, BBC
NEWS
(Oct.
29,
2010),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-11642433
[https://perma.cc/5F5T-BFE3].
91. See Hogan, supra note 62, at 452 (“The more responsive the government
is to the public before a [P3] is signed, the less they will have to undertake costly
renegotiation or similar measures after[wards].”).
92. See Chasity H. O’Steen & John R. Jenkins, We Built it, and They Came!
Now What? Public-Private Partnerships in the Replacement Era, 41 STETSON L.
REV. 249, 287–99 (2012) (reviewing how to counteract common contract issue in
P3 agreements, including the private-partner’s nonperformance and the publicpartners desire to undertake repairs not contractually provided for).
93. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 11; Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15,
at 288.
94. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 10.
95. Id. (highlighting the failed P3 agreement for the State Route 91 express
toll lane project in Orange County, California, where financial or performance
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exist where private-sector partners have sued to renegotiate after
a project failed to generate expected profit and forced the publicpartner into a buy-out before the end of the contractual concession
period.96 Such occurrences have raised questions about whether
the public-partner actually remains the ultimate risk holders
under the P3 model. 97 Successful P3 legislation would require P3
agreements to establish explicit policies for renegotiation in case of
future changes in circumstances to ensure the flexibility of publicpolicy throughout the P3 concession period.98
A fourth major concern in the formation of P3 agreements is
the appropriateness of the P3 model for a given project. A review
of the worldwide experience with P3s revealed that “public and
private entities must evaluate projects on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether a public-private partnership arrangement will
benefit both parties and the community in meeting infrastructure
needs.”99 One of the most common and sizeable mistakes made at
the onset of a P3 project is the choice to use P3s on the wrong type
of project.100 Arguably, the most recognized major infrastructure
developed through government agreements with private
companies are toll highways.101 Toll highways allow private
investors to recoup their investments through high use fees.102
Infrastructure projects that present the opportunity for private
partners to charge user fees and apply them towards repayment of
the private investments are therefore more appropriate than
projects that charge the public additional use fees for use of
necessary infrastructure, which goes against the public’s

challenges forced the public partner to buy out or take over the private partner’s
obligations); see Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288; see also O’Steen &
Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302 (describing a successful P3 partnership as a
thoughtfully-constructed business plan that clearly establishes the partners’
different responsibilities and provides a process for dispute resolution in case of
unexpected challenges).
96. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 10.
97. Id.
98. Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288; see also Siemiatycki, supra
note 38, at 10.
99. O’Steen & Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302.
100. Ballati & Robinson, supra note 15, at 32.
101. Id. at 31.
102. Id. at 30.
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interest.103 Since delivery of an infrastructure project through a P3
approach requires significant technical and legal input that creates
high transaction costs, prospective partners should determine
early in the process whether the size and scope of the project
justifies these costs.104
No one-size-fits-all private funding model works for every
infrastructure project.105 Even when the P3 structure is
appropriate for a given project, success will likely only be achieved
if both parties establish practical hopes and expectations.106
Rationally, another element in successful P3 partnerships is the
government’s selection of a private-sector partner with the best
“value” for the project. In this context, value means the privatepartner’s long-term ability to fulfill contractual duties and
obligations under the P3 agreement, not just the private entity
that offers the “lowest bid” to complete the project.107 Some experts
suggest that a P3 project will most likely succeed if both partners
are willing to invest in extensive legal representation and
consultations prior to reaching a concession agreement.108 Thus,
P3s are considered neither “a panacea nor an inescapable recipe
for disaster.”109 Their success turns instead on the thoughtful
handling of the project’s specific circumstances in the formation of
the agreement to ensure a fair outcome for both partners.110
A persistent unfamiliarity with P3 models amongst municipal
governments poses a final obstacle to successful implementation of
P3 models in public-infrastructure projects. Among Sabol &

103. See Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 73 (citing David
Tanner, DOT Appointee Foxx Downplays Tolling Funding Solution, LAND LINE
MAG. (May 22, 2013), https://www.texasturf.org/2012-06-01-03-09-30/latestnews/public-private-partnerships/351-foxx-downplays-tolling-but-fan-of-p3s
[https://perma.cc/5NDK-FQ6V] (“DOT Secretary Anthony Foxx said he was in
favor of using P3s, but that interstate tolling should only be used to add new
capacity to the highway system and should not be viewed as a complete solution
to the Highway Trust Fund shortfalls.”).
104. See Ballati & Robinson, supra note 15, at 33 (offering best practices
stakeholders can use to avoid this problem); see also Key to Unlock Potential
Investors, supra note 72.
105. O’Steen & Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302.
106. Id. at 303.
107. Id.
108. Ballati & Robinson, supra note 15, at 32–33.
109. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6.
110. Id.
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Puentes’ nine P3 recommendations to public leaders is their advice
to assemble a competent and skilled public-sector team able to
create and carry-out informed procurement decisions while
entering into P3 agreements.111 Two elements considered common
in successful P3 partnerships are: (1) the existence of public-sector
commitment to the P3 approach at all levels of government to
promote “a stable, predictable, and reliable procurement process”;
and (2) active and consistent public-sector involvement in the
partnership, including monitoring of the private-sector partner’s
performance through some form of benchmarking and specified
evaluation methodology.112 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
responsibility to fulfill these roles and produce “official reports that
evaluate the merits of using [P3] procurement for a given project,”
often falls on local government planning, engineering, and legal
departments.113
The recent surge of interest in modern P3 models throughout
the United States has not yet resulted in comprehensive “public
sector understanding of the [P3] landscape.”114 Untrained and
underprepared municipal staff are much more likely to fail to
protect public interests in the formation, implementation, and
operations of P3 infrastructure projects. In 2012, Siemiatycki
reported that local municipal planners, lawyers, and professionals,
less experienced with major P3 deals in infrastructure projects,
were underprepared when first engaging with P3 deals.115
Although P3 guidance materials produced through bipartisan
federal and state action have encouraged states to enact P3
legislation and regulations, a quarter of states have yet to
implement P3 enabling statutes. 116 Moreover, not all existing
statutes direct state agencies to educate and train municipal

111. See Patrick Sabol & Robert Puentes, Private Capital, Public Good:
Drivers of Successful Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships, BROOKINGS (Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/private-capital-public-gooddrivers-of-successful-infrastructure-public-private-partnerships/
[https://perma.cc/L3ZM-UMMW].
112. O’Steen & Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302.
113. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6.
114. Sabol & Puentes, supra note 111.
115. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6.
116. See generally State P3 Legislation, supra note 80 (inferring that
fourteen of fifty states, or 27%, lack P3 enabling statutes).
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governments to undertake contractual negotiations for P3
agreements to fund infrastructure projects.117
In consideration of these shortcomings, comprehensive statelevel legislation should seek to minimize financial risks to the
public-partner posed by high interest rates and potential loss of
control over fee rates and service quality. Legislation should also
actively facilitate public input and consultation in P3 agreement
formation (possibly through the integration of Smart Growth
policy) and aid governments in their determination of the
appropriateness of a given project for a P3 model. Lastly,
legislation should provide for agreement renegotiation procedures
in the event of unforeseen or unfavorable outcomes and facilitate
the production of guidance materials from state agencies for local
and regional governments to increase municipal familiarity with
P3 formation, implementation, and operations.
IV.

FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY
A. The 2018 Infrastructure Plan and Federal Smart
Growth Policy

Before considering the lessons learned from existing state
legislation, this Note will explore how The Plan fails to extend
federal support for Smart Growth infrastructure development. The
Plan presents a particular image for the future of the nation’s
infrastructure. This image seems to present two messages: (1) that
state and municipal governments should shoulder more
responsibility for infrastructure projects and fill the void left by
prior federal funds through P3 contracts with private firms, and
(2) federal funds should prioritize rural infrastructure, with the
Plan explicitly allocating “$50 billion in no-string-attached
spending for communities smaller than 50,000.”118 The Plan, based
117. Id.
118. Aarian Marshall, Trump’s Infrastructure Plan Threatens to Leave Little
Cities Behind, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/trumpinfrastructure-plan-leave-little-cities/ [https://perma.cc/T4GX-E7DF]
(“allocating just $100 billion in match funds over 10 years for infrastructure
projects for the whole country”); see THE PLAN, supra note 7, at 3-5; see also
Elizabeth McNichol, It’s Time for States to Invest in Infrastructure, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-andtax/its-time-for-states-to-invest-in-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/M7EE-ZG7T].

19

230

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

on its core beliefs, not only fails to address known risks of P3
agreements to government entities, but it presents a policy that
would actively promote sprawl development, automobile
dependency, and the further allocation of funds away from critical
urban infrastructure. In doing so, The Plan ignores recent federal
Smart Growth policy.
A central element of the Plan, the proposed Rural
Infrastructure Program (“R.I.P.”), seeks to “provide for significant
investment in rural infrastructure to address long-unmet needs. . .
[and] spur prosperous rural economies,” and incentivize states to
“partner with local and private investments for completion and
operation of rural infrastructure projects.”119 Specifically, the Plan
allocates $50 billion to the R.I.P to “expand access to markets,
customers, and employment opportunities with projects that
sustain and grow business revenue and personal income for rural
Americans.”120 However, the Plan makes no separate allocation for
the maintenance and repair of high-risk urban infrastructure.121
This type of policy will certainly channel infrastructure funds
towards new development and away from existing urban
infrastructure, exacerbating existing issues with urban transit
systems.
The Plan’s emphasis on private funding and rural
infrastructure expansion suggests that possible negative aspects of
P3 infrastructure projects, including limited public input, the
inappropriateness of P3 use for certain projects, and the promotion
of and sprawl development, were inadequately considered. P3
legislation that integrates Smart Growth principles would consider
these economic concerns. Explicit integration of Smart Growth
review into state P3 enabling legislation, or the passage of
separate-but-supporting laws, will aid states and municipalities in
protecting public-interests, both environmental and economic,
when undertaking development projects via a P3 agreement.

119. THE PLAN, supra note 7, at 5.
120. Id. at 6.
121. See generally THE PLAN, supra note 7 (failing to make any specific
allocation for federal funds besides those for rural communities with populations
under 50,000).
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Recent Federal Support for Smart Growth Policy

Land use and development policies are traditionally viewed
within the exclusive purview of states and localities. 122 Since the
early 2000s, state and local governments have adopted different
aspects of Smart Growth policy.123 However, many state and local
infrastructure projects have been partially funded through federal
grants or supported by non-monetary programs.124 Through these
programs, federal agencies have supported state-level Smart
Growth approaches to development and a de facto national land
use policy emerged in the early 1990s.125
The Obama Administration was the first to coordinate federal
administrative policy on housing, transportation, and the
environment to support Smart Growth implementation at all
levels.126 For the first time, the Department of Housing and Urban
122. Salkin, supra note 10, at 381–82 nn.1, 2 (listing state executive orders).
123. Id.; see, e.g., Ed Bolen et al., Smart Growth: A Review of Program State
by State, 8 HASTINGS WEST NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145 (2001)
(specifically examining California’s adoption of Smart Growth policies at the state
and local level).
124. See EPA, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, FIVE YEARS OF
LEARNING FROM COMMUNITIES AND COORDINATING FEDERAL INVESTMENTS 2, 5, 21
(Aug.
2014),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201408/documents/partnership-accomplishments-report-2014-reduced-size.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MRQ-U9TH] [hereinafter FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING]; see HUD,
CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS PLANNING GRANTEE LIST 1–5 (Oct. 2018),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/CN_Planning_Grantees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MMR8-NQM4] (listing communities and the portion of the
cumulative $37,966,500 in CNP Grants each community received); see also HUD,
CHOICE
NEIGHBORHOODS
IMPLEMENTATION
GRANTEES,
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/Choice_Neighborhoods_Implem
entation_Grantees_List.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU3J-Z53K] (listing communities
and the portion of the cumulative $862,235,211 in CNI Grants each community
received); see also 2009-2017: Awarded Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.transportation.gov/BUILDgrants/all-projects-map
[https://perma.cc/G6KH-S4M4] (mapping out TIGER Grant recipients by year).
125. See GREGORY K. INGRAM ET AL., SMART GROWTH POLICIES: AN
EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND AND POLICY
ix, 7 (Gregory K. Ingram et al. eds., 2009).
126. HUD-DOT-EPA Partnership for Sustainable Communities, EPA,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/smartgrowth/hud-dot-epa-partnershipsustainable-communities_.html [https://perma.cc/D5PB-4HML]; Elana Schor,
Obama’s Partnership for Sustainable Communities will put the Feds’ Weight
Behind Smart Growth, GRIST (Feb. 25, 2010), https://grist.org/article/2010-02-24obama-admin-wants-to-green-your-local-community/
[https://perma.cc/ZL22BCJY].
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Development (“HUD”), the DOT, and the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), worked together to allocate federal
funds towards projects with inter-agency interests, including
housing located in close proximity to transit and the development
of infrastructure for transportation that helps reduce carbon
emissions from automobiles.127 These actions arose from the desire
to uniformly support sustainability at the federal level.128 The
federal government also recognized that Smart Growth provided
opportunities to reduce development and maintenance costs, while
simultaneously creating new jobs in the process.129
These federal agencies created inter-agency departments,
initiatives, and grant programs.130 The EPA’s Smart Growth Unit
became the Office of Sustainable Communities.131 HUD created
the Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities to distribute
grants, worth $140 million, to local Smart Growth endeavors.132
The DOT increased investment in urban infrastructure for highspeed, inter-city rail projects and coordinated with HUD to focus
transit investment towards recipients of HUD investments. 133 On
June 16, 2009, all three agencies announced the formation of the
Partnership for Sustainable Communities (“PSC”).134 The PSC
program coordinated “federal housing, transportation, water, and
other infrastructure investments,” in order “to make
neighborhoods more prosperous, allow people to live closer to jobs,
save households time and money, and reduce pollution.”135 Review
of agency websites suggests that the PSC program is currently
inactive.

127. See Federal Smart Growth, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND & POL’Y (Feb. 6,
2010), https://www.lincolninst.edu/news/lincoln-house-blog/federal-smart-growth
[https://perma.cc/7K4L-HJYJ] [hereinafter Federal Smart Growth].
128. See id.; see also FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING, supra note 124, at 6.
129. FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING, supra note 124, at 12.
130. See National Archives, Federal Permitting Improvement Steering
Council, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federalpermitting-improvement-steering-council, [https://perma.cc/EH6S-NJJ4].
131. Federal Smart Growth, supra note 125.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING, supra note 124, at i.
135. Sustainable
Communities
Resource
Center,
HUD,
https://archives.huduser.gov/scrc/sustainability/partnership.html
[https://perma.cc/ZC29-U243].
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Federal grant programs have been central to federal support
of Smart Growth. Recent inter-agency grant programs included
Capacity Building for Sustainable Communities (“CBSC”) and
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (“SCRP”). 136 The
CBSC provided grants to regional and local planning projects that
incorporated housing and transportation concerns, and improved
the ability for land use and zoning regulations, allowing for
private-investments to support sustainable communities.137 The
DOT and EPA issued SCRP grants to support urban and intermunicipal planning efforts that “consider challenges of economics,
energy use, public health, and the environment.”138 However, both
are listed as inactive in HUD’s 2017 Major Mortgage, Grant,
Assistance, and Regulatory Programs report.139 Additional nonmonetary programs have rewarded communities for Smart Growth
achievements. In 2002, the EPA first presented the National
Award for Smart Growth Achievement (“NASGA”).140 NASGA
“recognize[d] and support[ed] communities that use[d] innovative
policies and strategies to strengthen their economies, provide[d]
housing and transportation choices, develop[ed] in ways that
[brought] benefits to a wide range of residents, and protect[ed] the
environment.”141 The EPA no longer presents the NASGA.142
Despite the discontinuance of these grants and awards, the
EPA still provides information about Smart Growth programs on
its website.143 The DOT also continues to allocate grants towards
136. U.S. DEP’T OF URBAN HOUS. & DEV., HUD PROGRAMS 2017: MAJOR
MORTGAGE, GRANT, ASSISTANCE, AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS 103–04 (2017),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUDPrograms2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KV8D-STD2] [hereinafter HUD PROGRAMS 2017].
137. Id. at 103.
138. Id. at 104–05.
139. Id. at 103–05.
140. National
Award
for
Smart
Growth
Achievement,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/national-award-smart-growth-achievement
[https://perma.cc/4L64-JGPN] [hereinafter National Award].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Smart Growth, supra note 11; Regional, State, and Local Opportunities
for
Funding
Smart
Growth
Projects,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/regional-state-and-local-opportunitiesfunding-smart-growth-projects [https://perma.cc/9ZWN-NXN9]; see also Building
Blocks
for
Sustainable
Communities,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/building-blocks-sustainablecommunities#background [https://perma.cc/YY76-HHCJ].
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capital transportation infrastructure development under the
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (“FAST”) Act.144 In 2015,
the FAST Act extended the Transportation Infrastructure Finance
and Innovation Act (“TIFIA”) Program, “which provided [f]ederal
credit assistance to eligible surface transportation projects,
including highway, transit, intercity passenger rail, [and] some
types of freight rail False”145 The FAST Act “authorize[d] $305
billion over fiscal years 2016 through 2020 for the Department’s
highway, highway and motor vehicle safety, public transportation,
motor carrier safety, hazardous materials safety, [and] rail
[investment].”146 Projects may qualify for TIFIA credit assistance
if the project costs are equal to or in excess of $50 million or is a
qualifying project type with a lower cost threshold (e.g., transitoriented development, rural infrastructure, and local
infrastructure projects).147 A recent project funded by a TIFIA
grant that exemplifies Smart Growth principles, and infill
development practices, is the Moynihan Train Hall in New York
City.148 Thus suggesting that although the Plan lacked the
influence of Smart Growth principles, federal support for Smart
Growth policies still continues in some capacity.
While federal policies and programs related to the
environment and transportation affect infrastructure development
144. 23 U.S.C. §§ 601–609 (2019).
145. Id.; Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act or “FAST Act”: Fact
Sheet,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
TRANSP.
FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/fastact/factsheets/tifiafs.cfm
[https://perma.cc/LH85-PNHN] [hereinafter FAST Act Fact Sheet]. Further
financial assistance came through secured loans, loan guarantees, and lines of
credit to the states, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico, municipalities, other
public authorities, or “private entities undertaking projects sponsored by public
authorities.” FAST Act Fact Sheet, supra note 145.
146. Environmental Review Toolkit, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN.,
https://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/legislation/authorizations/FASTact.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CD9F-V6NY].
147. 23 U.S.C. §§ 601(a)(12)(E), 601(a)(5), 602(a)(5)(B)(iv) (2019); FAST Act
Fact Sheet, supra note 145.
148. Andrew Bender, Inside New York City’s Moynihan Train Hall: The
Future
of
Penn
Station,
FORBES
(Oct.
7,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2016/10/07/inside-new-york-citysmoynihan-train-hall-the-future-of-penn-station/#5f9a388d2f8a.
[https://perma.cc/HAA8-AVGB]; see also Moynihan Train Hall, U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP.
(2017),
https://www.transportation.gov/tifia/financedprojects/moynihan-train-hall [https://perma.cc/5GGX-KQEA].
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practices, the power to directly regulate development and make
development decisions remains predominantly with state and local
governments.149 Leaving these powers with the states is logical.
The majority of infrastructure projects concern local and regional
systems and the communities that they serve, which means state
and local governments are best positioned to determine the
projects to prioritize based on the needs and interests of the
effected public. For example, of the almost 56,000 structurally
deficient bridges across the country, only about 1,900, or 3.4%, are
located on the Interstate Highway System.150 However, smallerscale, local projects are less appropriate for the P3 model than
larger projects on interstate highways and transit-hubs.151 Thus,
the shift in federal policy away from Smart Growth suggested,
through the reduction in federal programs and lack of integration
in the Plan, an increased need for state-sponsored Smart Growth
legislation to counteract decreased federal participation.
Integration of Smart Growth policies into state-level P3 legislation
can help state and local governments ensure public input into P3
agreement development, determine the appropriateness of a P3
model for a given project, allow for the economic benefits of Smart
Growth (discussed below), and help maintain the spread of Smart
Growth development.
C.

Why Smart Growth? How Smart Growth
Addresses Disadvantages of P3 Use

When entering into a P3 agreement, the public partner “must
protect the public interest and safety while finding ways to finance
infrastructure projects.”152 By supporting public input and
minimizing future maintenance costs through limiting sprawl
149. About Smart Growth, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/aboutsmart-growth#smartgrowth [https://perma.cc/BWS4-WEFP] [hereinafter About
Smart Growth].
150. Nearly 56,000 American Bridges on Structurally Deficient List, New
Analysis of Federal Data Shows, AM. RD. & TRANSP. BUILDERS ASS’N,
https://www.artba.org/2017/02/15/nearly-56000-american-bridges-onstructurally-deficient-list-new-analysis-of-federal-data-shows/
[https://perma.cc/7QP6-HWYB].
151. Infrastructure that serves large interstate populations can more easily
support the integration of additional user fees and offer private-partners better
returns on investments than local or regional infrastructure.
152. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72.
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development, the application of Smart Growth policy and practices
to agreement formation helps ensure projects create desirable
infrastructure to best serve public needs.153 Smart Growth
practices also minimize environmental harms of infrastructure
development by addressing unnecessarily wasteful and impactful
patterns of human development.154 Despite federal support for
Smart Growth practices, its principles and methods are largely
derived from the sprawl-friendly Plan.155 State and local
governments must therefore work to implement multilateral
Smart Growth initiatives to help address the harmful
environmental and economic impacts of P3 projects discussed
above.
No universal definition exists to describe the group of
development and land management policies known as Smart
Growth. To the EPA, Smart Growth comprises “a range of
development and conservation strategies that help protect our
health and natural environment and make our communities more
attractive, economically stronger, and more socially diverse.”156
Academics consider Smart Growth “a necessary, balanced land use
planning device.”157 The Urban Land Institute’s (“ULI”) definition
of Smart Growth reads “an evolving approach to development,”
with the goal “to balance economic progress with environmental
protection and quality of life.”158 Another organization, the
American Planning Association (“APA”), focuses on the creation of
community, equitable development, fiscal responsibility, and
integration of long-range, regional, and sustainable development

153. See Edward T. Canuel, Supporting Smart Growth Legislation and
Audits: An Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning Theories and Tools, 13
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 309, 346 (2005) (supporting implementation of Smart Growth
regulations despite the critique that developers may find such regulations
complex to navigate). Some states, such as Maryland, chose to make Smart
Growth review practices encouraged but not mandatory to minimize such
critiques. Gerrit-Jan Knapp & Dru Schmidt-Perkins, Smart Growth in Maryland:
Facing a New Reality, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND & POL’Y 9, 10 (2006),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/smart-growth-maryland
[https://perma.cc/KES8-ESYN].
154. See Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6–7.
155. THE PLAN, supra note 7.
156. About Smart Growth, supra note 149.
157. Canuel, supra note 153, at 309.
158. Id. at 313.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/6

26

2019]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

237

viewpoints.159 Each definition reflects the underlying basis of the
Smart Growth Principles.
The ten Smart Growth Principals form the policy’s
methodological basis. P3 agreements that apply these principles
during agreement-formation would consider the following
practices: integration of mixed land uses, creation of walkable
neighborhoods, preservation of open space and critical
environmental areas, direction of development toward existing
communities, provision of various transportation options, and
encouragement of community-stakeholder collaboration.160 P3
agreements for infrastructure projects that adopt elements of
Smart Growth will receive the proven benefits of these
considerations, including, but not limited to, the expansion of
economic activity and increased environmental protection.161
Regulatory Smart Growth review can provide a list of factors
used by parties to determine the adherence of a project to Smart
Growth principles.162 Based on the mantra “Save Money by Taking
Better Care of What You Have,” compulsory review can save public
partners money by supporting the dedication of funds to the
maintenance of existing structures and freeing limited funds for

159. See APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, AM. PLAN. ASSOC. (Apr. 14,
2012),https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm
[https://perma.cc/X78W-X34T] [hereinafter APA Policy Guide of Smart Growth].
160. See What is Smart Growth?, SMART GROWTH AM. (2017),
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/our-vision/what-is-smart-growth/
[https://perma.cc/AT3A-BUDH] (providing the full list of 10 Smart Growth
Principles).
161. The Project for Code Reform, CONG. FOR THE NEW URBANISM,
https://www.cnu.org/our-projects/project-code-reform
[https://perma.cc/QJ4XFZFS].
162. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 6-0101, 6-0105 (McKinney 2010)
(establishing the New York State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act,
which requires review of any infrastructure development for the maximization of
“the social, economic and environmental benefits from public infrastructure . . .
through minimiz[ation of] unnecessary costs of sprawl development including
environmental degradation, disinvestment in urban and suburban communities
and loss of open space induced by sprawl facilitated by the funding or development
of new or expanded transportation . . . infrastructure”); see also Heidi
Mouillesseaux-Kunzman et al., New York State’s Smart Growth Public
Infrastructure Policy Act of 2010: Implementation Through 2014 and Significance
for
Local
Government,
17
CARDI
REPORTS
(May
2015), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/55993/CaRDI_Repor
ts-17-final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y/ [https://perma.cc/UCC2-SGZT].
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the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure.163 States,
municipalities, and private parties that support Smart Growth
approaches believe these programs help grow state, regional, and
local economies through strategic investment.164 The APA
“recognizes the tremendous economic growth potential” of Smart
Growth tools like infill development and suburban corridor retrofit
that present “existing suburban corridors with the opportunity to
create more efficient development patterns that allow for a wider
variety of economic opportunity, access, and placemaking.”165
These funding and investment policies have been termed “smart
lending.”166
The environmental benefits of Smart Growth infrastructure
development are also widely acknowledged. Smart Growth seeks
to minimize future environmental harms of infrastructure
expansion by addressing unnecessarily wasteful and impactful
patterns of human development.167 The EPA states that,
“development guided by [S]mart [G]rowth principles can minimize
air and water pollution, reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
encourage cleanup and reuse of contaminated properties, and
preserve natural lands.”168 Furthermore, Smart Growth practices
that promote compact development, safeguard environmentally
sensitive areas, mix land uses, and support public transit can
lessen the need for new infrastructure.169 The affordability of
infrastructure maintenance and development relates directly to
the unsustainable pattern of suburban sprawl.170 To address this,
163. APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, supra note 159, at 1 (“the [APA]
recognizes that maintaining, expanding, and optimizing the use of existing or
prior public infrastructure investments resulting in more rational and efficient
use of limited public resources and helps to preserve the natural environment”);
see also SMART GROWTH AM., IOWA SMART TRANSPORTATION: SAVE MONEY AND
GROW
THE
ECONOMY
2
(2011),
https://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/app/legacy/documents/smarttransportation-iowa.pdf [https://perma.cc/L23Q-TNN2] [hereinafter IOWA SMART
TRANSPORTATION].
164. See IOWA SMART TRANSPORTATION, supra note 163, at 3–5.
165. APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, supra note 159, at 1.
166. 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW & GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 2.12
(2d ed. 2019).
167. See Siemiatycki supra note 38, at 6–7.
168. About Smart Growth, supra note 149, at 4.
169. Id.
170. SPRAWL RETROFIT INITIATIVE: THE CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM,
THE
UNBEARABLE
COSTS
OF
SPRAWL,
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the Smart Growth practice of infill development promotes the
redevelopment of existing structures or development on already
developed land.171 Another practice, transit-oriented development,
focuses on mixed-use projects located near current transit
infrastructure or where expansion of transit infrastructure is least
impactful.172 Smart Growth legislation, regulation, and advisory
programs that favor infrastructure projects that integrate these
practices not only contain sprawl, they function to provide
ridership and funding to transit systems, reduce automobile and
road usage, and minimize the need for additional highway and
roadway infrastructure.173 The benefits of Smart Growth policy
and practices clearly possess the capability to counter the
weaknesses of P3 agreements that can harm the public’s interests.
V.

EXISTING STATE LEGISLATION: A
MARYLAND CASE STUDY

P3 agreements and Smart Growth practices are both
necessary tools in the modern era of infrastructure redevelopment.
States have already begun to employ aspects of both through
legislation, regulation, and administrative guidance. Past
experience with P3s around the nation provides insight into the
ways that P3 agreements for public infrastructure projects might
inherently harm the public’s environmental and economic
interests. To minimize these harms, state P3 legislation may direct
state agencies to adopt specific processes for P3 agreement
formation.174 Such regulations would aid municipal officials in
https://www.cnu.org/sites/default/files/SPRAWL-RETROFIT-UNB_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38KE-DRYE].
171. What is Infill and Redevelopment?, COMPLETE COMMUNITIES TOOLBOX,
https://www.completecommunitiesde.org/planning/landuse/what-is-infill/
[https://perma.cc/2SPD-RJ9G].
172. HIROAKI SUZUKI ET AL., TRANSFORMING CITIES WITH TRANSIT: TRANSIT
AND LAND-USE INTEGRATION FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 37–38 (2013),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
947211468162273111/pdf/Main-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TPM-RQQR]; see
also Transit-Oriented Development, FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.transit.dot.gov/TOD [https://perma.cc/3FDN-J6YV].
173. See SUZUKI, supra note 172, at 13–14 (discussing the substantial capital
investments necessary to develop a transit system).
174. Bolen et al., supra note 123, at 5–8 (listing states by the Smart Growth
efforts each had adopted up until 2001); Canuel, supra note 153, at 341–343
(discussing Maryland’s Smart Growth legislation and programs).
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ensuring that the public’s environmental and economic interests
are protected.175 State P3 legislation can also protect less-powerful
players in infrastructure development, such as subcontractors and
material suppliers concerned with inadequate payment assurances
in P3 projects.176 As of November 2014, nine states “require the
private-partner and the prime contractor to provide performance
and payment bonds” on P3 projects.177
Smart Growth legislation that requires regulatory Smart
Growth review of all P3 infrastructure projects can further
minimize harms to the public. In theory, P3 legislation can
integrate Smart Growth considerations to address concerns with
P3s, as well as shortcomings, such as the lack of federal funding
support for improving and expanding urban-transit. The
integration of Smart Practices into P3 legislation and regulation,
or passage of separate but complementary legislation, will work to
prepare states and municipalities to negotiate P3 agreements, that
of which provide for public input in project development and
prioritize compact development patterns. The subsequent case
study of a recent P3 agreement in Maryland in light of the state’s
underlying P3 and Smart Growth laws reveals final lessons on how
state legislation must be structured to ensure reduction of public
harms to the greatest extent possible.
Despite Maryland’s extensive history as a state leader in
Smart Growth policy, it struggled to protect the public interest in
recent state-level P3 agreements due to the structure of the state’s
P3 legislation.178 A P3 law intended to bring investments to
175. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72. Some P3 laws already
direct contracting partners to contemplate protection of the public interest when
providing for risks in P3 agreements, such as when a private partner fails to
deliver. Id. An example would be if the private operator of toll road cannot pay
and files bankruptcy, the contract provides how the toll road still pays at least
partly for itself. Id.
176. 33 States, Including Maryland, Have Enacted Laws Authorizing Public
Agencies to Enter into Private-Public Partnerships, 38 CONSTR. CONT. L. REP. 6, at
¶ 247.33 (Nov. 7, 2014) (this concern arises when P3 agreements are exempt from
mechanic’s liens and payment bond requirements) [hereinafter 33 States].
177. Id. (The states that joined Maryland are Florida, Maine, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, California, and Ohio.)
178. See Canuel, supra note 153, at 341–45; see also Pete Tomao, Larry
Hogan Couldn’t Have Canceled the Red Line So Easily if a New Bill Had Been
Law, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://ggwash.org/view/40913/
hogan-couldnt-have-canceled-the-red-line-so-easily-if-a-new-bill-had-been-law
[https://perma.cc/6WNT-RJXF] (discussing how Maryland needed new legislation
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Baltimore’s terminally underfunded urban transit systems, HB
560 (Maryland’s P3 Law), instead became the catalyst for the
cancelation of existing transit projects in exchange for the
expansion of congested highways and the construction of highspeed toll lanes.179 Maryland’s experience with the application of
its P3 legislation exemplifies how state legislatures should retain
a check on executive control over state-level P3 agreements, and
how explicit inclusion of Smart Growth review practices offers one
such possible check and P3 laws should not be structured to avoid
such review.
The use of Maryland’s P3 Law to fund and construct
problematic high-speed toll lanes goes against prior Smart Growth
policy in Maryland.180 Since 1997, Maryland incrementally
adopted new programs and initiatives that became collectively
referred to as the “Smart, Green, and Growing” legislative package
under Governor Martin O’Malley, a Smart Growth-friendly
Democrat.181 Some praised Maryland’s previous Smart Growth
program before O’Malley for a structure that used incentives to
encourage developers to focus development in Priority Funding
Areas (“PFAs”), “communities and places where local governments

in 2016 to prevent Hogan from reducing state aid for transit projects and
supporting highway projects that promote urban-sprawl); see also Press Release,
Martin O’Malley, Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t, Governor Martin O’Malley
Announces Legislation to Reduce Global Warming Pollution (Jan. 23, 2009),
https://mde.maryland.gov/programs/Pressroom/Pages/1165.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4FBU-F9X2] (on file with author) (asserting that, prior to
Hogan’s policy changes, O’Malley recognized climate change as a threat to
Maryland’s public interests that mass transit improvements could help address)
[hereinafter O’Malley Announces Legislation].
179. H.B. 560, 440th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009); Erin Cox & Luke
Broadwater, Under State Law, Opponents to Hogan’s $9B Toll Lane Plan Have
Little
Recourse,
BALTIMORE
SUN
(Sept.
22,
2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-hogan-highway-p3story.html [https://perma.cc/5NFP-L7YC]; Andrew Zaleski, A $9 Billion Highway
That
Promises
to
Pay
for
Itself, CITYLAB
(Sept.
26,
2017),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/09/a-9-billion-highway-thatpromises-to-pay-for-itself/541119/ [https://perma.cc/85KT-XDGD]; 33 States,
supra note 176, at ¶ 247.33;.
180. See Tomao, supra note 178.
181. Id.; see also Parris N. Glendening, Maryland’s Smart Growth Initiative:
The Next Steps, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1493 (2002) (discussing Maryland’s
Smart Growth initiatives up until 2002); O’Malley Announces Legislation, supra
note 178.
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want State funding for future growth.”182 Critiques of the
program’s success of directing growth into the PFAs influenced
O’Malley to pass laws “intended ‘to strengthen and reinvigorate
the fundamental tools of Smart Growth’” and “to protect the
environment of Maryland, promote higher density development in
existing communities, and to encourage sustainable growth.”183
Through this legislative package, O’Malley sought to support the
expansion of transit projects and budgeted nearly $700 million
towards the construction of the Red Line, a “proposed 14-mile eastwest light rail line [intended to run] between Woodlawn in
Baltimore County and the Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center
in east Baltimore.”184 One may reasonably conclude that O’Malley
signed P3 legislation with the intent of funding Smart-Growth
oriented transit projects.
O’Malley’s infrastructure policies align with generally agreed
upon Smart Growth principles that investment in roadway
expansions through the addition of high-speed toll lanes offers only
a temporary fix to congestion. Not only does funding extensive toll
lane expansions fail to address aging urban infrastructure, but
widened roadways return to pre-expansion levels of congestion in
as little as one-year due to the phenomenon of induced demand.185
182. David Beste, Growing Pains: Maryland’s Struggle to Introduce Smart
Growth to a Growing Population, 18 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 79, 88 n.40 (2010)
(quoting MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, SMART, GREEN, AND GROWING PLANNING GUIDE 7
(2010),
http://planning.maryland.gov/PDF/OurProducts/Publications/otherPublications/
SGG_Guide_ 09_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KLJ-X9AY]; Gerrit-Jan Knapp &
Dru Schmidt-Perkins, supra note 153; see also Canuel, supra note 153, at 342,
343.
183. Beste, supra note 182, at 83; see also Tomao, supra note 178.
184. See Associated Press, O’Malley Announces $690M for Red Line in
Baltimore,
DAILY
RECORD
(Sept.
4,
2013),
https://thedailyrecord.com/2013/09/04/omalley-announces-690m-for-red-line-inbaltimore/ [https://perma.cc/3PQT-ZV6V] (reporting O’Malley’s allocation of
another $246 million for the replacement of Baltimore’s 100-rail cars and
signaling systems).
185. Gilles Duranton & Matthew A. Turner, The Fundamental Law of Road
Congestion: Evidence from US Cities, 101 AM. ECONOMIC REVIEW 2616, 2645-46
(2011),
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.6.2616
[https://perma.cc/DW3K-R38Z]; Angie Schmitt, The Science is Clear: More
Highways Equals More Traffic. Why are DOTs Still Ignoring it?,
STREETSBLOGUSA (June 21, 2017), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2017/06/21/thescience-is-clear-more-highways-equals-more-traffic-why-are-dots-still-ignoringit/ [https://perma.cc/NZ22-LCJ8]; Zaleski, supra note 179, at 3.
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Those who support this perspective say that decreasing the
number of cars on existing roadways is the key to congestion
reduction.186 Improving and expanding mass transit to increase
availability and ensure reliability, increases transit ridership,
helps to reduce the number of auto-commuters, and relieves
congestion.187
The Red Line Project never came to fruition because of the
structure of Maryland’s P3 Law and the election of Republican
Governor Larry Hogan in 2014.188 Passed in 2013 by thenGovernor O’Malley, HB 560 authorized state agencies to “adopt
regulations and establish processes. . .”189 Drafted by a Democratcontrolled legislature with a Democratic governor, Maryland’s P3
Law failed to provide any useful means for later legislatures or
administrators to check executive implementation.190 Instead,
Maryland’s P3 Law allows any sitting Governor to avoid the state
legislature’s traditional budgetary approval powers by entering
into major P3 agreements solely through Maryland’s
Transportation’s Authority.191 In addition, Maryland’s P3 law did
not require such projects to adhere to existing Smart Growth
policies.
After his election, Hogan used Maryland’s P3 Law to facilitate
the addition of hundreds of miles of toll lanes to three of the state’s
most congested highways.192 Under the loophole provided in
186. Eric Jaffe, Does Light Rail Really Alleviate Highway Congestion?,
CITYLAB (Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2012/02/doeslight-rail-really-alleviate-highway-congestion/1358/
[https://perma.cc/CF342FHG] (reviewing Sutapa Bhattacharjee & Andrew R. Goetz, Impact of Light Rail
on Traffic Congestion in Denver, 22 J. OF TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 262 (May 2012)).
187. Id; see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 2–4.
188. Christian Schaffer, Governor Hogan Defends Decision to Cancel the Red
Line,
WMAR
BALTIMORE
(Oct.
30,
2018),
https://www.wmar2news.com/news/political/governor-hogan-defends-decision-tocancel-the-red-line [https://perma.cc/R8BQ-TNUU].
189. H.B. 560, 440th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009); 33 States, supra
note 176, at 1 (authorizing such agencies as: (1) the Department of General
Services; (2) the Maryland Department of Transportation; (3) the Maryland
Transportation Authority; (4) and certain higher education institutions); Cox &
Broadwater, supra note 179.
190. Cox & Broadwater, supra note 179.
191. H.B. 560.
192. Cox & Broadwater, supra note 179 (discussing Hogan’s plan to add four
toll-lanes to I-270 at a cost of $6 to 7 billion, and to have Maryland finance $1.4
billion of toll lane construction on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway).
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Maryland’s P3 Law approach, Hogan’s plans required approval
only from the Board of Public Works, a three-member body
comprised of the governor himself and two others.193 The P3
legislation allowed for private developer to offer proposals for how,
when, and where to build the new lanes that require expansions
into abutting communities, with no assurance of Smart Growth
review to help ensure community involvement in the plan
development process. To fund these agreements, Hogan also
cancelled O’Malley’s Red Line project.194 Hogan relied on the
immediate economic benefit of the P3-DBF model – that the
agreement costs taxpayers nothing now – to garner public
support.195 Support resulted despite either the agreement’s failure
to consider a regional perspective, or failure to integrate public
concerns into a determination of which infrastructure
developments, through P3 agreements, could fix two problematic
situations: the congestion on three of Maryland’s major highways
and the inadequacies plaguing urban transit and state-wide
rails.196 Thus, the prior legislature’s creation of a streamlined
approval process for P3 agreements, which failed to integrate the
state’s existing Smart Growth laws, inadequately provided future
legislative or administrative checks over the formation of P3
agreements. Ultimately, this process failed to reflect the Smart
Growth-friendly policies of the drafting-legislature. Consequently,
states should learn from this and seek to explicitly integrate Smart
Growth review for individual agreements into P3 legislation and
regulation.
193. H.B. 560.
194. Michael Dresser & Luke Broadwater, Hogan Says No to Red Line, Yes
to
Purple,
BALTIMORE
SUN
(June
25,
2015),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-hogan-transportation-20150624story.html [https://perma.cc/6L46-TMGX] (“By eliminating the expense of the Red
Line and scaling back the state’s share of the Purple Line, Hogan freed up
hundreds of millions of dollars he plans to use to undertake a significant shift in
the state’s transportation priorities from public transit to road projects.”).
195. Pamela Wood, Maryland Gov. Hogan’s Toll Lane Project in D.C.
Suburbs
Causes
Dissent,
BALTIMORE
SUN
(June
3,
2019),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-md-toll-plan-20190603-story.html
[https://perma.cc/CT44-JQNF]; see also Ross Filice, Maryland Nixed its Options
and is Moving Ahead with Road-Widening and Tolls on I-495 and I-270, GREATER
GREATER WASHINGTON (Mar. 13, 2019), https://ggwash.org/view/71262/marylandis-moving-ahead-with-its-plan-to-widen-highways-and-add-more-tolls
[https://perma.cc/8FUD-KLHC].
196. Filice, supra note 195; Wood, supra note 195.
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CONCLUSION

With dwindling funds available for surface transportation
projects, many governments depend increasingly on P3
agreements to finance infrastructure projects.197 In consideration
of these shortcomings, state-level legislation should: (1) minimize
risks to the public-partner posed by high interest rates and
potential loss of control over fee rates and service quality, (2)
actively facilitate public input and consultation in P3 agreement
formation (possibly through the integration of Smart Growth
policy), (3) help governments determine a project’s appropriateness
a for the P3 model, (4) provide for P3 renegotiation procedures in
the event of unforeseen or unfavorable outcomes, and (5) facilitate
production of guidance materials by state agencies to improve
municipal familiarity with P3s. State legislatures should explicitly
require Smart Growth review for all infrastructure projects to help
provide a check on executive P3 legislation implementation and
ensure the protection of the public’s environmental and economic
interests to the greatest extent possible.

197. Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) Popular Globally, Gaining Stature in
United States, 36 CONSTR. CONT. L. REP., July 20, 2012, at ¶115.
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